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ABSTRACT: The Latin American “Turn to the Left” consisted in either the consolidation of traditional left-of-centre par-
ties or the emergence of new anti-neoliberal populist projects that decisively shaped the respective national party sys-
tems in reaction to major neoliberal crises. Some Southern European countries similarly experienced the rise of new 
populist parties (Podemos, Syriza and the Five Star Movement) while in Portugal we witnessed the consolidation of the 
existing left-of-centre parties. This article proposes a middle-range theory to give a cross-regional account of the even-
tual emergence of different anti-neoliberal populist parties in the aftermath of a neoliberal economic crisis. The argu-
ment focuses on the heterogeneity of such an 'Anti-Neoliberal Populism' category, by looking at the party organisation 
and the relationship with the unions and with the anti-austerity social movements. The framework thus proposes four 
different categories of “successful political projects” emerged in the aftermath of the crisis: a “Labour-based Left” (in 
Uruguay and Portugal); a “party-rooted populism” (in Argentina and Greece); a “movement (based) populism” (in Bolivia 
and Spain); and a “leader-initiated populism” (in Venezuela and Italy). 
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1. Introduction and Research Question1 
 
The Great Recession, and the austerity measures adopted to cope with it, have led to social and political 
discontent in Southern Europe, visible in social mobilisations taking quite different forms. In the political-
electoral arena, the left side of the political spectrum in Spain, Italy and Greece has been reshaped in the ear-
ly aftermath of the crises by the rise of (left-wing) populist projects such as Syriza, Podemos and the (ideo-
logically more transversal) Five Star Movement, producing major electoral realignments. In Portugal, how-
ever, we observed a substantial continuity, although the pre-existing partisan Left was able to strengthen it-
self and to achieve governmental positions. The so-called ‘Pink Tide’, mainly in reaction to the Washington 
Consensus era and its social effects, marked the past twenty years in Latin America, and has been extensive-
ly analysed in comparative perspective (e.g., De La Madrid, Hunter and Weyland 2010; Levitsky and Rob-
erts 2011; De La Torre 2013), often stressing the variation between “populist” (e.g. Venezuela, Argentina, 
Bolivia, Ecuador) and “social-democratic” (e.g. Chile, Brazil, Uruguay) political projects but also within 
each of these categories, according to different party-society linkage strategies (Kitschelt 2000) adopted.  
This article intends to dialogue with the literature addressing, more precisely, the phase of emergence of 
challenger parties in times of crisis of neoliberalism in comparative perspective in Latin America (e.g., Mor-
gan 2011; Roberts 2014) and Southern Europe (e.g. Della Porta et al. 2017; Hutter and Kriesi 2019). This 
works proposes a typological theory that intends to ‘travel’ across both regions and that focuses on the com-
plex interplay between the political-electoral arena, the social mobilisations against austerity, and the union 
movements, to explain the different paths followed by the national Lefts in the countries analysed and the 
different kinds of anti-neoliberal populisms that emerged, by proposing a novel sub-categorisation of the 
broad (anti-neoliberal) populist category2. Three kinds of anti-neoliberal populisms are identified, according 
to the social and political processes leading to their emergence and to their organisational features: “move-
ment-based populisms” (the Bolivian MAS-IPSP and the Spanish Podemos), “party-rooted populisms” (the 
Argentine Kirchnerism and the Greek Syriza) and “leader-initiated populisms” (the Venezuelan Chavism and 
the Italian Five Star Movement). The article thus intends to contribute to avoid putting all these populist 
phenomena “in the same box”: a tendency that could provoke serious analytical pitfalls. 
The argument draws on the concept of union-party hub (Handlin and Collier 2008), i.e. the main leftist 
structures of interest aggregation at the societal and political level, typically composed by the main peak un-
 
1 This framework (and previous versions of it) has been presented in several academic conferences during 2016-2018 
(ECPR 2016; PSA 2017; ECPR 2018; SISP 2018) and forms the theoretical core of my recently published monograph 
(2020a), which empirically tests the framework on eleven case studies – including the eight case studies mentioned 
here. I am extremely grateful to the Partecipazione e Conflitto’s anonymous reviewers who highlighted major short-
comings concerning my earlier (and erroneous) adaptation of the critical juncture causal framework to my typological 
theory.  
2 I prefer to talk about “anti-neoliberal populisms” instead of categories such as “left/left-wing populism” (e.g., March 
2011) or “inclusionary populisms” (e.g., Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). The first category would not surely ap-
ply to the Italian Five Star Movement, which has been sometimes, although controversially (see e.g. Pirro 2018), in-
cluded within the “inclusionary populist” category (e.g., Font et al. 2019). However, on the one hand, such category de-
rives from the so-called “ideological” approach to populism, which posites, erroneously in this author’s view (see also 
Katsambekis 2020), “anti-pluralism” as a defining attribute of populist phenomena. On the other hand, the category of 
“anti-neoliberal populism” better captures a central feature of all the populist phenomena analysed in this article, i.e. 
their rejection of austerity measures, as part of a broader rejection of the neoliberal model (including calls for ‘demo-
cratic renewals’, as Hutter and Kriesi 2019 put it), as a central part of their agendas, discourses and identities. By adopt-
ing such label, this article intends to escape any “ahistorical” use of the concept of populism (in this sense, see Moffit 
and Tormey 2013).  





ion confederation(s) and the main left-of-centre or labour-based (Levitsky 2003) political party, often linked 
each other by strong organisational linkages (Tsakatika and Lisi 2013). In particular, the argument highlights 
how the (eventual) weakening and the discredit of such structures of interest aggregation (and socio-political 
integration) made them unable to channel the popular discontent triggered by the crisis of neoliberal econom-
ic model and hegemony, and conduced to the emergence of new social actors representing the demands of 
broad popular and middle-class sectors, looking at credible political aggregators of such demands. 
The article thus also intends to contribute to the literature regarding the effects of social movements on 
electoral politics, at least in terms of formation or emergence of various kinds of populisms. The literatures 
on social movements and on party politics and party organisations have not talked to each other for a long 
time, although during the last years various attempts of integrating them have been made (e.g., MacAdam 
and Tarrow 2010; Della Porta et al. 2017). This article offers a perspective about the relationship between 
non-institutional and political-electoral politics in times of crisis, as a part of a broader framework. 
 
 
2. Rises and Varieties of Anti-Neoliberal Populisms in Latin America and South-
ern Europe 
 
Since many similarities between the social and economic crises in several Latin American countries and 
the Southern European Great Recession have already been noticed (Zanotti and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016; 
Roberts 2017), the lack of comprehensive researches about the rise of anti-austerity, progressive populisms 
in the two regions is surprising3. All of these crises, apart from provoking enormous social costs, have been 
initially addressed from a policy standpoint through “orthodox”, pro-cyclical measures. In both regions, 
pressures from international (such as the IMF) and supranational institutions (in the case of Southern Europe) 
were decisive for the implementation of pro-cyclical economic policies (e.g. Streeck 2011). Not coinci-
dentally, only in these two regions anti-neoliberal populisms have achieved considerable success. Some im-
portant works directly or indirectly provide important insights for the central topics of this research, although 
they did not offer per se a comprehensive answer to the questions that this article tries to address, for differ-
ent reasons. 
Della Porta et al. (2017), after having disclosed the strong links between the structural transformations 
brought by neoliberalism, its crisis, and the appearance of anti-austerity protest cycles, focus on the relation-
ship between anti-austerity movements and parties in Southern Europe. Della Porta and colleagues also offer 
a comparison with Latin American experiences (Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela). The book highlights the 'ne-
oliberal turn of the centre-left' and the 'politicization of new cleavages' (namely, social and political exclu-
sion) as explaining factors for the rise of new 'movement parties'. While building up of some of Della Porta 
et al.’s insights, I also argue that the concept of 'movement party' is insufficient to capture the variation be-
tween different experiences, both at the social movements and at the parties level. Such an approach may 
tend to underemphasise the different demands and sociological profiles of the anti-neoliberal movements that 
 
3 While studies on the Latin American Pink Tide abound, comparative analyses of the emergence of different kinds of anti-
neoliberal populist parties in Southern Europe are scarce (Della Porta et al. 2017 and, in part, Hutter and Kriesi 2019 are major 
exceptions). Academic research has mostly focused on descriptive accounts of ideological and discursive differences within 
the family of the European Radical Left in the aftermath of the Great Recession (e.g., Katsambekis and Kioupkoulis 2018) or 
within Southern European “inclusionary” populisms (e.g., Font et al. 2019). It does not develop causal accounts for these vari-
ations. 




emerged in both Latin America and Southern Europe, and may lead to explain the different movement-
parties linkages in a non-satisfactory or unsystematic manner4. The attempt of this article is precisely to offer 
a comprehensive interpretation of the variation between different movement-party linkages in the countries 
selected. Considering the movements’ ability of pursuing alliance-building strategies to understand their dif-
ferent impact on both the social and political-electoral sphere (as for instance Yashar 2006 [on Andean coun-
ties] and Silva 2009 [in a broader analysis of Latin American anti-neoliberal mobilisations] did) seems also 
crucial to understand such variation.  
Kenneth Roberts’ masterwork on party system changes in Latin America as a reaction to neoliberal re-
forms (2015) has also been key to develop the argument of this article. Roberts first differentiates between 
Latin American countries that had followed an ISI (Industrialisation through Substitution of Importations) 
path to economic development from those which did not. Only in the former group (including Argentina, 
Uruguay, Bolivia and Venezuela, among others), transition to neoliberalism implied strong changes in state-
society relations and stronger social resistances. In Roberts’ analysis, established party systems, in these 
countries, faced major changes only when the same party that acted as the political integrator of the working-
class under the ISI phase (e.g., the Argentine PJ, the Bolivian MNR or the Venezuelan AD) concretely im-
plemented pro-market reforms, often through a ‘bait and switch’ strategy (Stokes 2001). Only in these cases 
we witnessed the upsurge of new populist challengers, who proved to be particularly able to appeal to the 
growing – as a by-product of neoliberal reforms – number of labour market outsiders (Morgan 2011). While 
the argument of this article builds up on Roberts’ work, it starts from a conceptualisation of populism that, 
unlike Roberts’, puts also emphasis on its ‘bottom-up’ and articulating features, without overlooking its ‘top-
down’ characteristics. By this way, it is also possible to shed further light on the ‘Argentine exception’, i.e. 
the resilience of the Peronist political movement despite its ‘neoliberal turn’ under Carlos Menem.  
By relying on the extensive theoretical literature on populism, we must here recall why (anti-neoliberal) 
populist political projects, in both regions, proved to be so appealing under such a contentious and difficult 
context. First, populist projects, by “emphasizing similarities and downplaying differences” (Jansen 2011) 
amongst heterogeneous social sectors, broadly included in a common “People”, differentiate themselves 
from more traditional interest or class-based appeals and cast a wide net to attract different social strata in 
highly fragmented and stratified societies. The enemy of “The people” is usually identified by antineoliberal 
populisms, unsurprisingly, as a neoliberal (and even neo-colonial: see Filc 2015) elite and as those sectors 
enjoying allegedly illegitimate privileges due to their ties with the “establishment”. Such elite is the sup-
posed ultimate cause of all the different grievances emerging in the country, according to populist discourse. 
Furthermore, populist leaders, parties and movements pretend to speak in behalf of the totality of (their) 
People in order to occupy the public institutions and bring a political change: populist projects thus under-
score the centrality of nation-state structures to implement concrete changes.  
While populisms are surely concerned with the outputs of democracy (Barr 2009), they can be also (and 
sometimes even more) concerned with its input side, offering very different (and even contradictory) solution 
to restore national and popular sovereignty (Padoan 2017). Some “populist subtypes” (what I defined else-
where [2017] electoral-delegative populisms) tend to focus exclusively on the outputs, and develop organiza-
 
4 It would be “unsatisfactory” if we relied on Kitschelt’s (2006: 180) definition of movement parties: “coalitions of po-
litical activists who emanate from social movements and try to apply the organizational and strategic practices of social 
movements in the arena of party competition”. Such definition would not really apply to any of the parties under scruti-
ny. It would be instead “unsystematic”, and prone to quite ad hoc explanations of movement-parties linkages, if we de-
fined movement parties, as Della Porta et al. do (2017: 4-5), as “political parties that have particularly strong organiza-
tional and external links with social movements”.  





tional models that can be either quite rudimentary and centred on the unmediated relationship between a 
‘Leader’ and the ‘Masses’ (in the so-called “neo[liberal]populisms”: Weyland 2001), or closer to the tradi-
tional mass-party (in the populist radical Rights: Heinisch and Mazzoleni 2016). Instead, new mechanisms of 
direct and participative democracy and of candidate selection have been commonly suggested by anti-
neoliberal populisms, arguing that the poor record of liberal democracies is the direct consequence of the 
scarce involvement of “The people” in the decision-making process. Therefore, the solution would lie in the 
mobilisation and the active political participation of the citizens, and particularly of the popular sectors, in 
order to occupy State institutions (participative-mobilising populisms: see Padoan 2017).  
Several organisational features of anti-neoliberal populist projects, in which a certain autonomy of the par-
tisan periphery in terms of agenda setting and membership recruitment, along with “ideological flexibility”’, 
make them particularly fit to dialogue with different, particularistic movements – whose impact in the public 
sphere, in times of crisis, was often very high - and to be perceived by such movements as a “loyal institu-
tional ally”, thus easing the creation of a broad “popular network” in which the political party plays a nodal 
role.  
Nevertheless, decentralisation is typically accompanied by a strong cohesion at the top of the party’s pyr-
amid, to control factionalism and to assure party discipline. A strong leadership also provides the party with 
a single voice to be exploited for communication purposes and reserves some room of manoeuvre for tactical 
adjustments in a fluid context. 
However, not all the Lefts were shaped by the emergence of successful populist political projects. Moreo-
ver, antineoliberal populisms also assumed very different characteristics. I opted for creating a typology of 
possible “outcomes”: i.e. the different kinds of anti-austerity political projects that achieved a dominant – or, 
at least, electorally relevant – position within the Lefts in the aftermath of the crisis. These “successful politi-
cal projects” are quite easily identifiable in all of the countries selected: in Latin America, the Bolivian 
MAS-IPSP, Venezuelan Chavism, Argentine Kirchnerism or the Uruguayan Frente Amplio; in Southern Eu-
rope, the Spanish Podemos, the Italian Five Star Movement, the Greek Syriza, and the Portuguese Radical 
Left, composed by two different parties (the Portuguese Communist Party and the Leftist Bloc).  
I claim that it is possible to relevantly categorise the different “successful projects” according to three, 
branching variables, namely: the previous existence, or not, of the political party and/or of partisan struc-
tures; their relationship with the unions; and the kind of party-(anti-austerity) movements linkages. This 
leads to the typology illustrated by Table 1. 
The first outcome is quite self-evident. It illustrates a pattern of political continuity. The existing Left, 
strongly linked to the organised working-class, is not only able to “resist”, but even to take electoral ad-
vantage of the crisis. The first outcome implies the resilience of the “old Left”, perceived as a credible alter-
native to “neoliberalism”, and able to play a leading role in the protests and achieve important electoral re-
sults. This is the outcome observed in Uruguay and in Portugal.  
The other three outcomes represent “populist paths” to realignments within (and beyond) the national 
Lefts. In contrast to Labour-based leftist parties, which keep strong linkages to the unions, rely on class-
based political discourse and retain mass-party organisational features, all the anti-neoliberal populist politi-
cal projects share quite different characteristics. In terms of internal organisation, they tend to approximate 
the “charismatic party” model described by Panebianco (1988), in which a strong leadership coexist with or-
ganisational decentralization, strong organisational linkages with contentious social movements and innova-
tive forms of participatory linkages (Tsakatika and Lisi 2013). Anti-neoliberal populist projects do not retain 
or seek any “special relationship” with the unions; they lack encompassing and coherent ideologies and typi-




cally advance inter-classist appeals by claiming to represent “The people”, exploited by rapacious political 
and economic elites. Their discourse is centered on the necessary restoration of popular and national sover-
eignty, through People's re-occupation and strengthening of state institutions, against a political class unre-
sponsive towards “the People” and only accountable to national and foreign corporate powers and suprana-
tional institutions (Padoan 2017). 
 
Table 1 - The Dependent Variable. A Typology of the ‘Successful Political Projects’ Shaping the National Lefts in the Af-
termath of a Crisis of Neoliberalism. 
 
  Pre-Existing Partisan Structure New Partisan Structures 
Successful 
Projects on the 
Left 





Unions remain the most 
important organizational 
linkage 
Relationship with the unions depends on 
conjunctural factors. 
Unions at best as 
subordinate allies 
Antagonistic relationship 
with the unions, fully 






and incorporation of 
labour market outsiders' 
demands helped to bridge 
the insider-outsider’s 
representational divide 
Cooperative-cooptative strategy towards 
the movements through populist rhetoric 
and organizational 
decentralization/fractionalization 
The party exploits the 
populist frames and the 
militancy produced by 
the protest cycle.  
Issue-owning' strategy 
towards fragmented 






Party retains control of 
candidate selection 
process.  
Party retains control of candidate 
selection process.  
High overlapping 
membership and strong 
influence of the 
movements over the 
party, in terms of 
political platform and (in 
the case of movement-
based populism) of 
candidate selection. 
Low, apart from cases of 
overlapping membership at 
the local level (→agenda 
setting, candidate selection). 
Plebiscitarian internal 
organization + bottom-up 
procedures for 
mobilizational purposes  
Empirical 
Cases 
Frente Amplio (UY); 
Portuguese Radical Left 
Kirchnerist Peronism (AR); Syriza (GR) MAS-IPSP (BO); 
Podemos (ES) 
Chavism (VZ); Five Star 
Movement (IT) 
Source: Author’s Elaboration. 
 
The two, theoretically and empirically, possible successful political projects relying on existing political 
parties are the labour-based Left, described above, and “party-rooted populism”. In the latter case, an exist-
ing party assumes an inclusive (i.e., pluralist and non-sectarian) and antagonistic populist discourse and, 
thanks to specific organisational resources, develops strong electoral linkages with multiple social sectors 
and effective organisational linkages with the protesters. Argentine Kirchnerism and the Greek Syriza fall 
into this category. Organisationally, both parties displayed some forms of power decentralisation (particular-
ly in the Kirchnerist case, which exploited the Peronist electoral machinery) which proved to be fit for their 
brokerage role. In both cases, the leader retains and strengthens her autonomy on strategic choices, and even-
tually coordinates the distribution of particularistic incentives (either programmatic or – in the case of Kirch-
nerism - clientelistic) to keep the loyalty of different organised (and mobilised) actors. 
The last two outcomes consist in the rise of a new anti-neoliberal populist party. Nevertheless, these out-
comes highly differ in terms of their linkages with unions and social movements and – particularly – their 
internal organisation. In the path labelled leader-initiated populism (Venezuelan Chavismo and the Italian 





M5S), the new party is fully centred, since the beginning, around its founder's and leader's figure, a typical 
political “maverick” exploiting the window of opportunity generated by the crisis. As for their internal or-
ganisation, very low barriers to entry and a certain autonomy of the grassroots at the periphery, in terms of 
political platform (in both Venezuelan and Italian cases) and candidates’ selection (in the case of the Italian 
M5S), coexist with a tight control from above of any crucial strategic decisions. The leader, lacking control 
of any mass movement or organisation, mostly relies on programmatic and charismatic linkages to appeal to 
quite dispersed and unorganised constituencies. Appeals for “democratic regeneration” against the entire so-
cio-political system (and, in particular, the union-party hubs, i.e. their closer competitors) and the promise of 
universalist social policies to deal with the social emergency provoked by the crisis are recurrent features of 
leader-initiated populisms. However, leader-initiated populisms also appeal to extra-institutional movements 
and interest groups, mainly through a strategy of “issue-owning”. The latter consists in the ability of collect-
ing and connecting disparate unsatisfied popular demands, while aspiring to be the only “true supporter” of 
all of these “micro-publics” (Spanakos 2011) who felt excluded by the previous political order.  
The fourth outcome is the rise of a movement (based) populism. As the label indicates, the influence of the 
social movements having animated the protest cycles over the party is higher than in the other three types. 
Nevertheless, this fourth outcome must be split into two subtypes. We can conceive the possibility that the 
main social movements leading the protests decide to enter electoral competition by themselves (as in the 
case of the MAS-IPSP in Bolivia), or the possibility that some social activists put into motion a political pro-
ject bringing into the polity domain the main demands emerging from the protest cycle (as in the case of Po-
demos in Spain).  
In the first case, we observe the creation of a movement-based party (Anria 2014), a sort of ‘instrument’ of 
the founding movements. In the second case, the movements de facto converge into the ‘sociopolitical space’ 
created by the party, thus providing to the latter militancy and finding in it a reliable institutional ally. In both 
kinds of parties, power centralisation allows to limit and solve both inter-organisational and factional dis-
putes and to strengthen electoral charismatic linkages. 
In movement (based) populist cases, we observed quite a complex and at times antagonistic relationship 
between the party and the unions, moving between cooperation and confrontation, particularly when the lat-
ter enjoyed strong links with the “old parties” (Padoan 2019) or when the movements are the expression of 
constituencies that are quite different from salaried sectors, as it occurred in the Bolivian MAS-IPSP (Silva 
and Rossi 2018). 
 
 
3. The Argument 
 
In the causal argument that this article advances, neoliberal crises act as the shock opening the critical 
juncture (Collier and Munck 2018) that decisively shape the leftist side of the party systems analysed (see 
Figure 1). I adopt the definition of Slater and Simmons (2010, 889), who define critical juncture as “periods 
in history when the presence or absence of a specified causal force pushes multiple cases onto divergent 
long-term pathways”. The relevant causal forces can act before (“critical antecedents”) or during the critical 








Table 2 – Periodization of economic shocks, consequent Critical Juncture and divergent outcomes in terms of realign-
ments within the political Left in eight Latin American/Southern European countries. 
 
Country Shock 
Beginning of Critical Junc-
ture 




1995 (beginning of economic 
recession); 1997 (Brazilian 
crisis); 1999 (initial austerity 
measures imposed by Presi-
dent De La Rúa) 
1999 (national diffusion of 
piquetero movements). Peak 
in 2001 (Argentinazo) 
2005 (legislative elections: vic-
tory of Kirchnerist faction over 
Right-Wing Peronist and Anti-
Peronist parties); 2007 (Cristina 
Kirchner's triumph in presiden-
tial elections) 
Kirchnerism dominating the Peronist 
space (2005-ongoing) 
Bolivia 
1999 (initial austerity 
measures imposed by Presi-
dent Sánchez de Losada) 
1999-2000 (Cochabamba 
Water War). Peak in 2002 
(Gas War; Sánchez de Losa-
da renounced) 
2005 (Evo Morales' triumph in 
presidential elections) 
Party system structured around the 
masista (Left) - antimasista (Centre-
Right; Extreme Right) dimension 
(2005-ongoing) 
Uruguay 
1997 (Brazilian crisis); peak 
in 2001 (effects of Argentine 
economic crisis) 
2001 
2004 (Tabaré Vázquez's tri-
umph in presidential elections) 
From a tripartite to a 'two-party and a 
half' party system (thanks to Left's 
stregthening): Frente Amplio (Centre-
Left; left) and 'traditional parties' 




1989 (implementation of 
draconian austerity 
measures; Caracazo) 
1989-1998 (on-going social 
and political instability, 'bait 
and switch' further imposi-
tion of austerity meausres, 
and further deterioration of 
economy) 
1999 (Hugo Chávez's triumph 
in presidential elections) 
Party system structured around the 
chavista (Left) - antichavista (Centre-
Right; Extreme Right) dimension 
(1999-ongoing) 
Greece 2010 (Troika intervention) 
2010-2013 (peak at 2012, 
when the second MoU was 
approved) 
May - June 2012 (Syriza's over-
taking over PASOK); January 
2015 ('pasokization', Syriza's 
triumph and election of Tsipras 
as PM)  
Syriza substituted PASOK as the main 
party of the  left-wing side of the polit-
ical spectrum (June 2012-ongoing) 
Italy  
2011 (ECB's letter calling for 
austerity measures; election 
of technocratic government) 
2011-2013 (Monti's techno-
cratic government) 
2013 (Five Star Movement be-
came the most voted party at the 
parliamentary elections) 
From bipolarism to tripartite party 
system: Movimento 5 Stelle, Center-
Left and Center-Right (confirmed in 
2018) 
Portugal 
2010 (first austerity 
measures imposed by Social-
ist government; then in 2011 
came the MoU) 
2010-2013 (phase of mobili-
zations led by Communist 
[majoritarian] trade unions) 
2015 (legislative elections; elec-
tion of Socialist Costa as PM, 
with parliamentary support of 
the Radical Left) 
Party system stability. For the first 
time, alliance at the national level be-
tween Socialists and Radical Left 
Spain 
2010 (first austerity 
measures imposed by Social-
ist government; then in 2011, 
ECB's letter calling for fur-
ther austerity measures) 
2010-2013 (phase of social 
movements' protests against 
austerity; peak in 2011-2012 
[Indignados and Mareas]) 
2015 (legislative elections; Po-
demos reached 20 percent of the 
votes, nearly reaching the 
PSOE) 
From two to multiparty system (con-
sidering the rise of new centre-right 
parties). On the Leftist side: higher 
relevance of the Left, first formation 
of coalition goverment (Sánchez gov-
ernment, 2019-ongoing) 
Source: Author’s Elaboration. 
 





The argument is a middle-range theory whose “scope condition” is the existence of a union movement tra-
ditionally playing a central role as civil society actor, enjoying historical links with a major labour-based or 
leftist party and mainly representing the salaried working-class. The scope condition and the occurrence of 
such a critical juncture theoretically motivates the case selection: for instance, many South American coun-
tries did not develop, for historical reasons (see Roberts 2014), party-union hubs comparable to those exist-
ing in Bolivia, Argentina, Venezuela and Uruguay (or did not experience comparable economic crises since 
their democratic transition); a similar argument can be made for Ireland or Iceland, which were dramatically 
hit by the Great Recession. 
The main critical antecedents are the political positioning of the union-party hubs and of the leftist parties 
in the pre-crisis scenario. These antecedents help to understand the subsequent evolution of the national po-
litical scenarios as they affect the credibility of the unions and of the parties as “antineoliberal” actors during 
the critical juncture. In addition, the linkages used by the parties in appealing to different segments of the 
voters, and the social composition of their constituencies, are variables to consider for a complete analysis of 
the “starting conditions” of the left-of-centre or labour-based parties when the crisis came and thus when the 
critical juncture began. We can chronologically circumscribe the “critical juncture” (see Table 2) in the peri-
od that precede what a posteriori we may call “critical elections”: presidential (in South America) or legisla-
tive (in Southern Europe) elections that came after major anti-austerity mobilisations and that were, in terms 
of agenda, clearly dominated by polarisation on highly unpopular neoliberal reforms (see, in this sense, Hut-
ter and Kriesi 2019). 
The precise duration of the critical juncture is thus subjected to the effective centrality of the debate on ne-
oliberal measures in the public agenda. In all the cases considered, the critical juncture ended when an actor 
clearly committed to end with austerity successfully emerged or achieved considerable electoral success, of-
ten changing either the left-of-centre political landscape (as occurred in Greece) or even the characteristics of 
the party system (as occurred for instance in Bolivia, Italy and Spain). However, this may be not necessarily 
the case: in Brazil, for instance, the relative success of the Cardoso Plan during the nineties closed the criti-
cal juncture with a substantial acceptance of the neoliberal socioeconomic model by all the main political ac-
tors (Handlin 2017). In the cases selected here, phases of political stalemates (as occurred in Greece during 
the 2012-2015 period) and presidential terms characterised by ‘bait-and-switch’ strategies (as occurred in 
Venezuela under the 1994-1999 Caldera’s presidency) or inaugurated by weak and indecisive victories (as 
occurred in Argentina in 2003 with Néstor Kirchner) contributed to extend the duration of the critical junc-
ture. In other cases instead, single “critical elections” (as occurred in Spain [2015] or Italy [2013], but also in 
Uruguay [2004] or Portugal [2015]) were sufficient to close the critical juncture.  
The characteristics of the main social mobilisations against the neoliberal model, jointly with the critical 
antecedents, create the political opportunities for the (eventual) emerging and consolidation of different vari-
eties of antineoliberal populist projects (i.e., the “outcome” phase in our model). The relevant “characteris-
tics” of the mobilisations are: a) the role played by the unions b) the kinds of demands advanced (often relat-
ed with the sociological profile of the protesters) and c) the ability of the movements to forge alliances 
amongst themselves. 
 




Figure 1 – The Argument 
Source: Author’s Elaboration. 
 
The argument builds up on Roberts’ (2015) work and implies that when the labour-based Left kept an op-
positional position during the neoliberal era, thus defending its credibility as a leading actor during the con-
tentious phase, the left side of party system remained stable. This occurred in Uruguay, where the traditional 
brotherhood between the Frente Amplio and the PIT-CNT led to a coherent socio-political bloc opposing the 
reforms during the nineties: the 2001-2002 economic crisis merely accelerated the long-term rising electoral 
tendency of the FA (Lanzaro 2004). In Portugal, the main peak union – the CGTP – kept its linkages with the 
Communist party, maintained its oppositional position before and during the crisis (while defending its pri-
macy within the union system against the moderate UGT, closer to the Socialists) and remained the most 
credible social actor against reforms and austerity, also tying alliance with other anti-austerity social move-
ments (Accornero and Ramos Pinto 2015). In Uruguay, the ideological and organisational fragmentation of 
the FA allowed the party to diversify its linkage strategy: the Partido Socialista kept its organisational link-
ages with the PIT-CNT; some centrist fractions (like Asamblea Uruguay) improved the image of the party as 
an actor ready to assume governmental responsibilities; finally, Mujica’s fraction advanced populist rhetoric 
and practices to appeal to the poorest strata and to establish organisational linkages with grassroots move-
ments focusing on housing and anti-poverty issues (Luna 2014). In Portugal, we observed a similar “division 
of labour” between the two (rival) far-left parties, the PCP (controlling the unions and appealing to urban and 
rural working-classes) and the BE (much closer to the social movements’ milieu). The leftist strategy pur-
sued by the PS, particularly under Costa’s leadership, helped to improve the deteriorated image of the party, 
and set the conditions for a post-electoral alliance in 2015 between the three major Portuguese left-of-centre 
parties (Lisi 2016).  





In contrast, where the party-union hubs have lost the credibility for assuming the leadership of the “anti-
austerity camp”, a populist project emerges. A protest cycle in which the different movements are able to tie 
close-knit alliances, typically through the adoption of populist frames targeting a “common enemy” (see 
Aslanidis 2016) and downplaying the differences between them in terms of ideology and demands, paves the 
way for the emergence of a movement (based) populism.  
Such a broad and unified protest cycle is likely to produce several “public goods” (Aslanidis 2016) such as 
inclusive frames and a numerous and motivated militancy, while its antagonism against the entire party sys-
tem make unlikely its co-optation. If the movements are unwilling to run electorally for “occupying public 
institutions”, or if they lack the necessary strength, then the militancy has to wait for a political project will-
ing to (and successful in) taking advantage of the “public goods” produced by the impacting “unified” pro-
test cycle (“movement populism”). This was clearly the case of Podemos, a party created “from above”, by a 
small number of activists around the mediatic figure of Pablo Iglesias, while also (and crucially) attracting 
numerous social movements activists that formed the backbone of the party elite and militancy at the nation-
al, regional and local levels and that found in the party a “space” to bring their social and participatory 
claims into the institutions (e.g. Martín 2015; Padoan 2020a). 
Otherwise, the movements can build their own “political instrument”, channelling popular discontent 
through institutional avenues (“movement-based populism”). The influence of the movements over the new 
political project, in terms of definition of the programmatic agenda and candidates' selection will be higher 
than in the other outcomes that I identified. The Bolivian MAS-IPSP perfectly fits into this category: the 
MAS-IPSP, as a party, is little more than a “political brand” representing the main Bolivian peasant and co-
ca-grower unions, although the coalition successfully expanded to include other actors, while the leadership 
(consisting of Evo Morales and his inner circle mainly composed by intellectuals and technocrats) achieved 
and strengthened its own autonomy over the grassroots throughout the years (Anria 2014). 
The absence of a unified cycle of protest, jointly with the incapacity of the unions to play a leading role in 
the protests, led to either the party-rooted populist or the leader-initiated populist electoral outcomes. In 
Greece, Syriza proved much more able than other political competitors (such as the KKE) to play a “broker-
age” role in the protests and to expand its influence within the “contentious camp”, thanks to its populist 
rhetoric, ideological pluralism and presence in the streets, despite its quite reduced militancy (Kanellopoulos 
et al. 2016; Della Porta et al. 2017). What Syriza did from the streets, Argentine Kirchnerism did from the 
institutions: President Kirchner was able to include in his coalition, through both programmatic and clien-
telistic linkages, most of the main social actors stemming from the piqueteros’ milieu or from radical union-
ism, which animated the long and fragmented Argentine protest cycle (1996-2003). Once built his own mili-
tant bases, and once strengthened his popularity thanks to the improvement of the socioeconomic condition 
of the country through quite radical policy decisions, Kirchner achieved the unchallenged control of the Pe-
ronist apparatus that had supported him in the 2002 presidential race, when he appeared a weak candidate 
under control of the former President, the conservative Duhalde (Ostiguy 2005). 
The absence of such an existing “broker” party left a political opportunity for a new political project to 
emerge, in a social scenario marked by dispersed protests further feeding popular discontent. Such a scenario 
is the perfect humus for the emergence of a political maverick advancing a populist discourse aiming to a) 
offer a single political answer to the particularistic demands emerging from the protests, and b) identify a 
broad category of “excluded citizens” and promise to incorporate them through programmatic, clientelistic or 
organisational linkages. While different in many aspects, the socio-political processes leading to the emer-
gence of the Venezuelan Chavismo and the Italian M5S shared striking similarities; furthermore, the ideolog-




ical vagueness, the anti-unionist positions, and the coexistence of organisational decentralisation, participa-
tive and deliberative features at the periphery, and a strong power centralization at the leadership level, are 
common characteristics of both Chávez’s and Grillo’s political projects. The very different ideological and 
programmatic evolutions (which provoked, in turn, very different organisational evolutions) of such experi-
ences seem clearly related to the extremely high room of manoeuvre at the disposal of the elites controlling 
both projects.  
In the following section, I first discuss more deeply how the critical antecedents that I identified above 
shape the “starting conditions” of the left-of-centre parties and thus their probability of keeping or achieving 
a dominant position within the Left in the aftermath of the crisis. Later, I better specify my categorisation of 
the different kinds of popular anti-austerity mobilisations, and I further clarify why this categorisation is rel-
evant for my argument and for the divergent outcomes. 
 
 
4. The Critical Antecedents. The “Starting Conditions” of Unions and Left-of-
Centre Parties 
 
In this section, I discuss how the different strategies of the main leftist parties and party-union hubs during 
the neoliberal era affected their probability of becoming electoral winners (or losers) in the post-crisis sce-
nario. Their eventual ideological moderation, their inability to go beyond their traditional core-constituencies 
(i.e. labour market insiders: Rueda 2007), and the weakening of their participatory linkages (Tsakatika and 
Lisi 2013), created greater or lesser liabilities for the post-crisis scenario. However, populist parties closer to 
the participative-mobilising subtype (see Section 2) displayed a higher ability to adapt in the post-crisis sce-
nario, as I argued in the previous section. 
  
4.1 Historical Roots of the Union-Party Hubs in Dualised Welfare Regimes 
 
In his seminal works, Rueda (2007) posited that the core-constituencies of the party-union hubs in South-
ern Europe are not the working class in its entirety. Instead, such core-constituencies are the insider sectors 
(i.e., salaried sectors with open-ended contracts), in partial detriment of the outsiders (i.e., unemployed, 
fixed-term or informal workers), who find high barriers to enter the “labour-market fortress” and are penal-
ised by the contributory schemes and the lack of safety-net policies typical of the Mediterranean welfare re-
gimes (Ferrera 1996). Party-union linkages were particularly important for the unions to keep a strong influ-
ence on labour market and welfare regime issues in countries where state regulation prevails (Rigby and 
García Calavia 2017).  
In Latin America, the countries that followed an ISI (Import Substitution Industrialisation) economic 
model also developed a highly segmented welfare state, albeit with much lower levels of coverage and ade-
quacy than in Continental Europe, due to state weakness and the size of the informal sectors (Haggard and 
Kaufman 2008). In those countries, the industrial and/or public sector workers normally provided an “encap-
sulated” core-constituency to labour-based parties such as the Uruguayan FA, the Argentine PJ or the Vene-
zuelan AD (Levitsky 2003), linked (programmatically and even organisationally) with powerful unions5. 
 
5
 Rueda et al. (2015) emphasized several similarities between ISI-shaped Latin American and Mediterranean dualising 
regimes, also considering the role of unions, and called for a cross-regional integration of the discussion of the cleavag-
es generated by those systems. 






4.2 The Evolution of Party Linkages: Detachment from Society and Looser Linkages 
with Weakened Unions 
 
During the apex of neoliberal hegemony, European social democracies rapidly embraced economic liber-
alism, loosened their long-standing ties with the union movement and emphasize their progressive post-
materialist stances to differentiate themselves from the Right. European social democracies began arguing 
that labour market deregulation was the solution to deal with the rise of unemployment. However, in Greece, 
Italy and Spain at least, unions remained in alliances (and kept mobilising key voters: Allern and Bale 2017) 
with their traditional party referents to defend their participation in the policy-making process (e.g. Etche-
mendy 2011). This generally allowed for the protection of the comparatively high levels of permanent em-
ployment protection, often at the cost of introducing lower protections for labour market outsiders and thus 
deepening dualisation (Rueda 2007; Pérez 2014). Even more worryingly, since the beginning of the Great 
Recession even insiders’ protection has been targeted by neoliberal reforms imposed by international finan-
cial and political institutions. As Hyman (2001, 52) put it, social dialogue “had come to mean sharing re-
sponsibility for the dismantling of many of the previous gains – acting as ‘mediators of transnational eco-
nomic pressures’”.  
In Latin America, the “neoliberal switch” on the part of some labour-based or left-of-centre parties (such 
as the Bolivian MNR and MIR or the Argentine PJ) was much more drastic, whereas in other cases, particu-
larly when they did not access to governmental positions, they kept a leftist profile (as in Brazil and Uru-
guay). Party-union linkages, as in Southern Europe, weakened but did not disappear, although the dramatic 
increase in job informality diminished the power and the representativeness of the unions. Both in Latin 
America and Southern Europe, union movements that opted for a more confrontational strategy better posi-
tioned themselves in the early aftermath of the crisis than the more “conciliatory” ones, particularly when un-
ion-party hubs were “trapped in government” when the economic crisis exploded – and concretely imple-
mented austerity measures to cope with the latter. 
To address the poorest sectors during the neoliberal era, labour-parties typically relied on a mixed strategy 
consisting in means-tested cash transfers and clientelistic arrangements, with mixed results. Furthermore, 
state retrenchment and economic and budgetary constraints limited the resources available for targeted 
and/or particularistic answers, which thus became less efficacious (Luna 2014; Afonso, Zartaloudis, and Pa-
padopoulos 2015) and the target of anti-corruption denunciations, particularly when the economic situation 
began deteriorating (Morgan, 2011). In addition, identitarian linkages, also because of the weakening of 
the social, cultural and organizational pillars of the old political cleavages, tended to weaken their ca-
pacity of ‘voters’ retention’ by the traditional parties. In particular, advanced forms of cartelization 
(Katz and Mair, 1995) increased the perception of the political parties as self-referential organizations 
detached from society and deepened the tendency towards declining trust on parties and institutions.  
 
 
5. The Social Mobilisations Against Neoliberal Model and Austerity 
 
The popular reactions against austerity measures, and against neoliberalism, took very different forms in 
the countries analysed here. I argue that the specific forms assumed by these mobilisations, jointly with the 
critical antecedents sketched in the previous section, shaped decisively and differentially the socio-political 




environment to which the existing parties had to adapt, and the political opportunities for the emergence of 
new parties on the left. 
 
5.1 The Varieties of Social Demands during Austerity and the Question of Inter-
Movements Alliances 
 
To recognise the variety of demands that were advanced by (broadly defined) anti-austerity movements is 
a crucial step for understanding how the movements influenced the social and political arena. I first propose 
a rough distinction between universalist, sectorial and local demands. Universalist issues, such as levels of 
social spending, the struggle against corruption, or for gender equality, or for a more participative democra-
cy, or for a radical rejection of the current political class, address a broad public and typically target national 
and supranational institutions in order to influence the law-making process and/or to claim for broad political 
change. I define them as universalist because they refer to broad constituencies, even the totality of the popu-
lation, as they often refer to the defence of public goods. “Populist social movements” (Aslanidis 2016) such 
as the Spanish Indignados or the Greek Aganaktismenoi clearly led universalist mobilisations, generally fo-
cusing on a harsh critique of the political class and demanding new forms of popular participation, whereas 
the Spanish Mareas – or the Argentine Frente Nacional contra la Pobreza [2001] –concentrated on the de-
fence of social rights.  
The campaign for a new Constituent Assembly served as a powerful aggregator of the alliance between 
very different Bolivian peasant and indigenous organisations often having different priorities. In a similar 
vein, the Indignados imposed an “anti-caste” rhetoric that served as a “master frame” for other mobilisations 
around more specific goals. However, such a broad alliance did not flourish in Italy (Zamponi 2012), where 
ideological divisions within the leftist milieu, and the own presence of multiple political parties within the 
protests, prevented the development of stable political coalitions between different actors. Albeit character-
ised, as the Italian street politics, by ‘social movement partyism’ (i.e., overlapping membership between dif-
ferent movements and different party actors), in Greece during the peak of the protest cycle (2010-2012) a 
‘competing mode of coordination’ (Kanellopoulos et al. 2016) between certain leftist actors involved in anti-
austerity protests has been observed (Simiti 2014; Kanellopoulos et al. 2016; Vogiatzoglou 2017).  
In turn, campaigns around local issues aim at provoking concrete and immediate changes or “answers” to 
some grievances emerging in a specific territory. Many such movements do frame their struggles as a form 
of resistance against the neoliberal socioeconomic model, and their targets are often public (even national 
and supranational) institutions, but their activists pretend to speak on behalf of a geographically concentrated 
constituency. These movements can flourish around very different issues, such as: contested public infra-
structures; privatisation of common goods or natural resources (the Water War in Cochabamba and the Gas 
War in El Alto, Bolivia); inadequate responses to local unemployment rates or dismissals (which triggered 
the piqueteros movement in Argentina: see Pereyra and Svampa 2003), etc.  
Finally, sectorial demands are advanced by activists claiming to defend a constituency defined on a basis 
other than a geographic one. These conflicts could refer either to the production (such as a conflict about 
wage increases for a specific job sector) or the consumption sphere, such as a campaign against rents’ or tar-
iff increases. Both local and sectorial demands are usually more disaggregated, thus potentially more suitable 
for ad hoc solution and more likely to find institutional allies to give an immediate solution to their concerns. 
I recognise that the borders between universalist, sectorial and local demands and mobilisations are 
blurred, and that many movements advanced “mixed” demands. The distinction, albeit more analytical than 





empirical, is useful to understand the different strategies available to political parties to respond to the 
movements’ demands. 
The union movement, empirically, has been an important participant almost everywhere (one way or the 
other) in the anti-austerity protest cycles (Ancelovici 2014). Nonetheless, the relationship between social 
movements and trade unions has often been difficult and full of suspicions. The unions have often been de-
picted as “discredited” or “bureaucratised” actors (as in Venezuela, Argentina, Greece and Spain, where the 
links with equally “discredited” parties were more evident), by several movements. The unions were some-
times accused of being almost exclusively focused on the interests of their core-constituencies. In Bolivia, 
for instance, the dominancy of the miners and the salaried workers within the COB finally forced powerful 
organisations, like the peasant unions, to organise by themselves, outside (and sometimes in contraposition 
to) the peak union confederation (Silva and Rossi 2018; Padoan 2020b). 
However, the unions often proved to be important institutional allies sustaining several protests over time, 
as put in evidence by Portos (2016) for the Spanish case. Economic dismissals, wage freezing and political 
attacks against labour rights opened a window of opportunity for “building a bridge” between outraged out-
sider and insider workers, a window that was exploited, for instance, by the Portuguese CGTP (in alliance 
with anti-austerity and precarious workers’ movements) and by the Argentine CTA, a new peak confedera-
tion organising both public sector and unemployed workers (Retamozo and Morris 2015).  
 
5.2. Patterns of Mobilisations Against Austerity 
 
Once having briefly analysed the different kinds of demands that the movements advanced, one should 
broaden the view to describe the macro-characteristics of the social mobilisations against neoliberalism and 
austerity. I identify three macro-types of patterns of mobilisations observable: (a) union-led, (b) unified and 
(c) fragmented protests (see also Figure 1).  
 
a) The union-led pattern emerged where the unions and, in general, the institutional Left, thanks to their 
organisational resources and their coherent oppositional activity in the pre-crisis period, played a leading role 
in the anti-austerity protest cycle and acted as the most important political articulator of the different seg-
ments of the popular sectors.  
 
In the other cases, the protest cycles were dominated by novel actors and the unions did not play any leading 
role in them. I called the additional, alternative patterns unified and fragmented.  
 
b) The unified pattern can be described as a broad cycle of protests where different social movements 
were able to build a close-knit alliance network advancing broad economic, social and political claims, typi-
cally around inclusive, “populist” frames (Aslanidis 2016). Even movements built around sectorial or local 
demands have the possibility of becoming part of a broader cycle of protest, by exploiting the resonant 
frames generated by the mobilisations. Such pattern is interpreted here as the precondition for the emergence 
of movement (based) populisms. It generates resonant, antagonistic frames that produce strong collective 
identities and identify the boundaries between the victims and the culprits of the crisis, thus paving the way 
for bringing the polarisation from the social to the political-electoral sphere. Crucially, the mobilisations also 
create a vast militancy, potentially ready to be involved in electoral politics if a proper political project 
emerges (like Podemos in Spain) or if the social movements are sufficiently strong and organised to opt for 




autonomously entering electoral competition (like the Bolivian peasant movements that founded the MAS-
IPSP).  
 
c) The last pattern of anti-neoliberal mobilisations that I identify is the fragmented one. Contentious 
movements mainly focus either on local or sectorial issues, without coordinating their demands at a broader 
level (and sometimes competing for scarce resources and looking for particularistic solutions and institution-
al allies, as occurred for instance in Venezuela or Argentina), or they find themselves divided along ideolog-
ical lines (as occurred in Italy), which makes difficult even the convergence around universalist campaigns.  
 
Mediating parties may fulfill the task of brokering, thanks to their organisational resources, and articulate 
the different demands by recurring to the use of populist frames, thus positioning themselves as the political 
referents of the struggles against austerity. Party-rooted populism is the outcome. Brokerage activity may be 
eased either by protest cycles in which a certain degree of collaboration between movements has been 
achieved (and reinforced by the own presence of political brokers, as occurred in Greece6), or by extensive 
territorial presence and control of public resources facilitating strategies of cooptation and alliance-building 
(as occurred in Argentina). In the absence of such mediating parties, fragmented protest cycle creates the 
perfect political opportunity for the emergence of a political outsider occupying a vacuum in the political 
space and positioning himself as a radical alternative to the party system. Leader-initiated populism is thus 
the outcome (see Figure 1). 
 
 
6. Failing Adaptations to the Socio-Political Environment Shaped by Anti-
Austerity Mobilisations 
 
In all the countries where an anti-neoliberal populist project emerged, there were existing parties that 
could have exploited the window of opportunity that was opened by the critical juncture, but they failed to do 
so. The weak participatory linkages of the Spanish Izquierda Unida (quite visible in its bureaucratic function-
ing), and its own discredit as a reliable antagonistic actor (Ramiro and Verge 2013), prevented it from play-
ing any relevant role in the protest cycle. The Bolivian Radical Left remained unable to tie linkages with the 
peasant movements, while the radical discourse of the Aymara ethno-nationalist party MIP proved to be dys-
functional for creating a nationwide alliance (Madrid 2008). In both countries, the own weakness or limita-
tions of the partisan Left favoured the development of alternative alliance networks composed by the move-
ments.  
Looking at the countries experiencing a fragmented cycle of anti-neoliberal and anti-austerity mobiliza-
tions, some comments over the trajectories of La Causa R (Venezuela), the FREPASO (Argentina), PRC and 
 
6 In this sense, the Greek protest cycle might be put in between our “fragmented” and “unified” categories. As Kanel-
lopoulos et al. (2016: 114) put it, “the overall network could neither be characterized as fully centralized nor as fully 
decentralized, neither as a cooperative one nor as an explicitly hostile one. In both cases it looks like an intermediary 
case”. However, as Simiti (2014: 18) stresses, this may apply only to the peak of the protests, in 2011: “the 2012 pro-
tests were smaller, less vociferous and more sector-fragmented […] After the Square movement, the protestors’ belief 
in the political efficacy of collective protest had weakened, undermining any further endeavour to unite diverse political 
forces”. Furthermore, as also Vogiatzoglou (2017) emphasises, divisions within the own “Square movement” still re-
mained quite visible. More generally, there was not any “sublimation” of political identities during the Greek protest 
cycle in a way comparable to the Spanish one (in this sense, see Díez García 2015), nor any coalitional arrangements as 
definitely occurred in Bolivia.  





SEL (Italy) and KKE (Greece) may contribute to fortify the argument presented here. The FREPASO, a par-
ty born in the mid-nineties aiming to occupy the left-of-centre space and to cross the traditional Peron-
ist/Anti-Peronist cleavage, for a while successfully dialogued with anti-neoliberal actors from alternative un-
ionism and grassroots movements. Its gradual encapsulation within urban middle-class sectors (mainly due 
to its positioning within the Anti-Peronist side: see Garay 2010), and its involvement in the pro-austerity De 
La Rúa’s presidency, fatally harmed its possibility of playing any role in the aftermath of the 2001 collapse. 
In turn, all the attempts of building a “political instrument” of the contentious movements failed, due to their 
extreme ideological heterogeneity and to the successful PJ’s and Kirchnerist strategy of dialogue with those 
movements more willing to “get their hands dirty” with the Peronist apparatus (Boyanovsky 2010).  
In Venezuela, La Causa R, a party with solid links with grassroots unionism, and with an anti-corruption 
and participative inspiration, became a major electoral force in the nineties. Nevertheless, LCR was “not 
populist enough”. Its quasi-utopian “assemblearism” harmed its ability of providing concrete response to the 
fragmented mobilised actors representing territorial or sectorial popular constituencies, while also provoking 
internal schisms (Hellinger 2003). Also because of its organisational genesis and structure – tightly linked 
with the so-called “new unionism” in the state of Bolívar – LCR failed to build up its own organisation 
throughout the country (and particularly in Caracas), and to develop its own linkage strategies with the ma-
jority of the working-class, i.e. urban poors occupied in informal sectors (Morgan 2011: 138). Its decision to 
pursue a moderate strategy within the Congress – including pacts with one of the “traditional parties” - gave 
the full control of the “antisystem”, anti-puntofijista discourse to Chávez’s project (Handlin 2017).  
In Greece, the ideological orthodoxy and isolationist strategy of the KKE prevented it from playing a bro-
kering role in the protests, despite its numerous and committed militancy, in stark contrast to Syriza’s trajec-
tory. Finally, in Italy, the ideological fragmentation of the political Left (already discredited by its negative 
governmental experience within Prodi’s coalition) was reproduced in the streets, making even more difficult 
the construction of a unified protest cycle. In addition, the strong influence exerted by institutional actors 
(like the CGIL) on the protests provoked a certain decline in contentiousness once Berlusconi resigned and 
the Democratic Party opted to back Monti’s technocratic government (Andretta 2018). The M5S had thus the 
opportunity of giving voice to disparate local, sectorial and universalist (anti-austerity, anti-corruption, par-
ticipative democracy, struggle against job precariousness…) demands, “retweeted” by Grillo’s blog and by 
M5S’ local branches (the MeetUps), whose autonomy in terms of programmatic platform, and their overlap-
ping membership with many local committees, were functional to such a successful “issue-owning” strategy 
(e.g., Mosca 2015). 
 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
The framework proposed here allows for categorising in a novel way the different anti-neoliberal populist 
projects that emerged, in different times, in Latin America and Southern Europe, in reaction to major eco-
nomic crises and to the austerity measures that were adopted to cope with them. Crucially, the framework 
provides a causal account of the different paths (i.e. the outcomes, or legacies, according to the critical junc-
ture framework) taken by the electoral Lefts in the countries selected. The categorisation proposed here, by 
focusing on the organisational features and on the kind of organisational and environmental linkages exploit-
ed by different types of populist projects, limits the risk of putting all these very different phenomena in the 
same “populist box”, and may be analytically useful to better understand, among other things, the different 




impact of social mobilisations on the political arena, the relationship between different anti-neoliberal popu-
lisms and the quality of democracy and of representation, or the linkage strategy and the sociological bases7 
of the electorates of each antineoliberal populist subtype.  
Focusing on the organisational features of these parties seems particularly important because it is a strong-
ly underresearched topic. Existing literature mostly focused on the novel (and plebisictarian) use of on-line 
tools (e.g. Gerbaudo 2018; Deseriis and Vittori 2019) for participative-mobilising purposes – with little re-
sults in terms of participation and efficacy. In contrast, this framework emphasises the importance of territo-
rial rootedness and of environmental linkages (Tsakatika and Lisi 2013) for party’s emergence (or resilience) 
and consolidation, still in “digital times”. As Pérez et al. (2019: 166) put it, “cyber activism can usefully 
complement mobilization tasks [but it has often favoured the transformation] from mass-organic to electoral-
professional parties”, i.e. one of the aspects of the process of party cartelisation that was one of the targets of 
the political projects analysed here.   
The framework also may shed new lights on the political consequences of (the lack of) ‘union revitalisa-
tion’ (Bryson et al. 2011) and to reflect on the strategies available to ‘party-union hubs’ in contemporary era, 
particularly in countries affected by severe welfare regime dualisation and failures to correct the latter. The 
“crisis of European social democracy” has been widely connected with such failures (e.g. Keating and 
McCrone 2013), and the loss of support for centre-left parties during the Great Recession has been effective-
ly much more pronounced in Southern Europe (Hutter and Kriesi 2019). Silva and Rossi (2018) have indeed 
argued that populist challengers in Latin America have led a kind of “incorporation” of labour market out-
siders within the polity domain, through different (organisational, programmatic and clientelist) linkage 
strategies. However, the same authors have emphasised the difficult relationship of some of these projects 
(particularly the leader-initiated populist ones) with the organised working-class. Even in Southern Europe, 
and particularly in the case of the M5S (Padoan 2019), we observed some tendencies towards the politicisa-
tion of the insider-outsider divide in a way that may jeopardise the legitimacy of any political role of trade 
unionism.   
Popular uprisings have recently rived other countries, such as Chile. Claims for “popular sovereignty”, an-
ti-neoliberal critiques, extreme dissatisfaction with the functioning of liberal-democratic institutions and 
scarce trust on existing left-of-centre parties are all key ingredients of the contemporary Chilean protest cy-
cle. Crucially, in Chile we previously observed a long process of “politicization of inequalities” in which so-
cial mobilisations played a key role (Castiglioni and Rovira 2016). This has been also identified as a key fac-
tor for explaining recent party system changes in Southern Europe, in contrast to other European countries 
where conflicts around the “cultural dimension” were more salient and where, consequently, radical right 




7 As I argued elsewhere (2020a: 266), “while the constituencies of Labour-based Lefts and party- rooted populisms had 
a mixed composition across the insider-outsider divide, and movement(based) populisms quite faithfully reflected the 
social composition [of their ‘founding movements’], in the case of leader-initiated populisms the core-constituencies 
were quite clearly the outsiders”. More fine-grained analyses of political sociology (and much better data) are needed, 
though. Covid-related lockdown measures, and the way these have been framed in the public discourse, may have even 
increased the explanatory capacity of the insider-outsider divide on political attitudes and voting behaviour. 
8 Not coincidentally, when cultural (e.g., the ‘refugee crises’) and national (e.g., the Catalan question) issues became 
relatively more salient than economic ones, even in Southern Europe we witnessed the delayed rise of radical right chal-
lengers (see also Padoan 2020a).   





Table 3 – Ideological and Organisational Resources of (old and new) party actors during the Critical Juncture (“suc-
cessful” projects in grey). 
 
  Ideological Resources Organizational Resources 








Enviromental Linkages with 
Movements 
Venezuela Chavism X     Still limited Strong, particularly with urban 
movements 
La Causa R     X Concentrated in its 
stronghold (Bolí-
var State) 
Concentrated in its stronghold (Bol-
ívar State) 
Argentina Justicialist Party – 
Frente para la Vic-
toria 
X     High Collaboration/Competition with 
"pragmatic" piqueteros and other 
territorial movements 
FREPASO – Front 
for a Solidarian 
Country 
    X Low None 
Bolivia MAS-IPSP X     High Extremely Strong  
MIP - Movimiento 
Indígena Pachakutik 





  High, but concen-
trated in La Paz 
Department 
Strong, but concentrated in La Paz 
Department 
Uruguay Frente Amplio   X   High Unions (close allies of the party) as 
the main social actors in the pro-
tests 
Italy M5S X     Still limited but in 
expansion 
Quite strong, particularly with some 
LULU movements (+ [even more 
decisively] "issue-owning" strate-
gy) 
PRC – Communist 
Refoundation Party 
  X   Medium to Low, 
in decline 
Only with ideologically close 
movements 
SEL – Left, Ecology 
and Freedom 
    X Low Low 
Greece Syriza X     Medium to Low Strong (brokerage role; overlapping 
membership) 
KKE – Greek Com-
munist Party 
  X   Medium Only with "ancillary" organizations 
Spain Podemos X     Still limited but in 
expansion 
Strong (overlapping membership; 
coordination for programmatic pur-
poses) 
IU – United Left   x X Low None 
Portugal PCP - Portuguese 
Communist Party 
  X   Medium  Unions (close allies of the party) as 
the main social actors in the pro-
tests 
BE – Leftist Bloc   X   Medium to Low Strong (overlapping membership) 
with precarious workers' move-
ments 
Source: Author’s Elaboration. 
 
Focusing on the legacy of the critical juncture opened by neoliberal crises (see Table 2), Latin American 
presidential systems have favoured party systems’ restructuration around a populist-antipopulist cleavage, 
while in Southern Europe the changes have been confined to the leftist side. Where ‘pasokization’ has been 




avoided, the greater saliency of the “cultural dimension” seems to have cemented new (litigious) coalitions 
within the (renewed) leftist space, although party identities, programmatic agendas and core-constituencies 
of “newcomers” remain quite different from mainstream parties’ ones. All of these considerations definitely 
support the positions of those scholars preferring to talk about “varieties of populisms” (e.g., Caiani and Gra-
ziano 2019) and to stress the very different structural and conjunctural conditions paving the way for the 
emergence of different “varieties”. 
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